Mary Day v. The State of Utah : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
Mary Day v. The State of Utah : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Larry R. Keller; Craigh L. Boorman; Larry R. Keller & Associates; Attorneys for Appellant.
Jan Graham; Debra J. Moore; Allan L. Larson; Anne Swensen; Snow Christensen & Martineau;
Attorneys for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Day v. State, No. 930135 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5005
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KF'J K 
50 
•A10 IN THE UTAH SUPREME C C ^ ^ < E T N 0 
DOCKET NO. ^n^c^TA 
MARY DAY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through the UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY; THE UTAH 
HIGHWAY PATROL; KEN COLYAR; 
SALEM CITY CORPORATION; a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah; BRAD JAMES; 
SPANISH FORK CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah; ED ASAY; 
PUBLIC ENTITIES 1-3; and 
JOHN DOES 1-8, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 
Priority 15 
93-0135-
BRIEF OF STATE APPELLEES 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding 
LARRY R. KELLER 
CRAIG L. BOORMAN 
LARRY R. KELLER & ASSOCIATES 
257 East 200 So. #340 (Box 10) 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
DEBRA J. MOORE (4095) 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 575-1650 
Attorneys for State Appellees 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
ANNE SWENSEN 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place #1100 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, 
Attorneys for Ci 
MAR 51993 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
MARY DAY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through the UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY; THE UTAH 
HIGHWAY PATROL; KEN COLYAR; 
SALEM CITY CORPORATION; a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah; BRAD JAMES; 
SPANISH FORK CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah; ED ASAY; 
PUBLIC ENTITIES 1-3; and 
JOHN DOES 1-8, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
LARRY R. KELLER 
CRAIG L. BOORMAN 
LARRY R. KELLER & ASSOCIATES 
257 East 200 So. #340 (Box 10) 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
Case No. 920438 
Priority 15 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
DEBRA J. MOORE (4095) 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 575-1650 
Attorneys for State Appellees 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
ANNE SWENSEN 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place #1100 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
BRIEF OF STATE APPELLEES 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for City Appellees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 3 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISION 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
NATURE OF THE CASE 3 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I TROOPER COLYAR HAD NO STATUTORY DUTY TO 
PROTECT THIRD PARTIES FROM FLOYD'S NEGLIGENCE 
OR RECKLESSNESS 10 
POINT II SOUND PUBLIC POLICY WEIGHS AGAINST IMPOSING 
LIABILITY ON A PURSUING OFFICER FOR INJURIES 
CAUSED BY A COLLISION WITH THE VEHICLE 
OPERATED BY THE PURSUED 14 
POINT III EVEN UNDER A GROSS NEGLIGENCE STANDARD, 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST DAY ON HER CLAIMS ARISING 
FROM THE COLLISION WITH THE VEHICLE DRIVEN 
BY FLOYD 18 
POINT IV THE STATE IS IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR DAY'S 
CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 21 
POINT V THE STATE IS IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR 
DAY'S CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 10(15) OF THE 
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 24 
i 
POINT VI SECTION 7 COMPORTS WITH THE OPEN COURTS 
CLAUSE 25 
A. Section 7 Did Not Deprive Day Of 
A Remedy Against The State 25 
1. The State Was Absolutely Immune 
From Tort Liability At Common Law . .25 
2. The Proprietary/Governmental 
Function Distinction Does Not 
Apply To The State 26 
3. Trooper Colyar Was Engaged In A 
Governmental Function In Pursuing 
Floyd 28 
4. The Open Courts Clause Does Not 
Protect Any Statutory Remedy 
Abrogated By Section 7 29 
5. Day Has Cited No Authority To Show 
That She Had A Right Protected 
By The Open Courts Clause 30 
POINT VII SECTION 7 COMPORTS WITH BOTH EQUAL PROTECTION 
AND DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES 30 
POINT VIII DAY'S CLAIMS FALL WITHIN THE DISCRETIONARY 
FUNCTION EXCEPTION TO THE STATE'S WAIVER OF 
IMMUNITY FOR NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS 32 
CONCLUSION 36 
ii 
Addendum A: Minute Entry dated July 23, 1992 
Addendum B: Order granting State Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment dated 
August 12, 1992 
Addendum C: Order and Summary Judgment dated 
August 13, 1992 
Addendum D: Determinative Provisions 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14 (1988) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1989) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7 (Supp. 1990) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1989) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 1992) 
Addendum E: Department of Public Safety 
Vehicle Pursuit Policy 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co.. 839 
P.2d 798 (Utah 1992) 3 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) . 30 
Binaham v. Board of Education. 223 P.2d 432 (Utah 1950) . 26, 27 
Boyer v. State. 594 A.2d 121 (Md. 1991) 19, 20 
Breck v. Cortez. 490 N.E.2d 88 (111. App. Ct. 1986) . . .20 
Bullins v. Schmidt. 369 S.E.2d 601 (N.C. 1988) . . . .20 
Campbell Building Co. v. State Road Commission. 70 P.2d 857 
(Utah 1937) 26 
Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co.. 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. App. 
1952) 16 
Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 
1989) 26, 27, 29, 31 
Cornwall v. Larsen. 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977) . . . . 12 
Crowder v. Salt Lake County. 552 P.2d 646 (Utah 1976) . . 27 
Dent v. City of Dallas. 729 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), 
cert, denied. 485 U.S. 977 (1988) 17 
Dewald v. State. 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986) 17 
Doe v. Arquelles. 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985) 33 
Fields v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 754 
P.2d 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 22 
Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor. 339 N.W.2d 413 (Mich. 1983) . . 13 
Frank v. State. 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980) 32 
Hale v. Port of Portland. 783 P.2d 506 (Or. 1989) . . . .28 
Jackson v. Layton City. 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1987) . . . .22 
Jepson v. State. 205 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (Utah Ct. App. 
January 27, 1993) 22 
Johnson v. State Retirement Office. 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 
1980) 23 iv 
Kellv v. Citv of Tulsa. 791 P.2d 826 (Okla. Ct. App. 
1990) 13, 14 
Lewis v. Bland. 599 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio App. 1991) . . . 17 
Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services. 667 P.2d 
49 (Utah 1983) 32, 33, 35 
Mason v. Bitton. 534 P.2d 1360 (Wash. 1975) . . . . 13 
Myers v. McDonald. 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981) . . . . 22 
Nevill v. City of Tullahoma. 756 S.W.2d 226 (Tenn. 1986). . 17 
Niblock v. Salt Lake City. 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800 
(1941) 11 
Peak v. Ratliff. 408 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 1991) . . . . 18, 19 
Rollins v. Petersen. 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991) . . . .10 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City. 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980) . 25, 28 
Stanton Transp. Co. v. Davis. 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 
(1959) 12 
Stanton v. State. 285 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), 
affirmed. 259 N.E.2d 494 (NY 1970) 16 
State of West Virginia v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y.. 
263 F. Supp. 88 (D. W. Va. 1967) 16 
State v. District Court. 78 P.2d 502 (Utah 1937) . . . .26 
Thornton v. Shore. 666 P.2d 655 (Kan. 1983) . . .14, 15, 16 
United States v. Hutchins. 268 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1959) . . 16 
United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense 
(Varia Airlines) . 467 U.S. 797 (1984) 35 
West v. United States. 617 F. Supp. 1015 (D.C. Cal. 1985) . . 20 
Wilkinson v. State. 134 P. 626 (Utah 1913) 25 
STATUTES 
47 Okla. Stat. 1981 § 11-106 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(15) (Supp. 1992) 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1989) 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15(1) & -16 (1989) 23 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1992) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 (4) (a) (1989) 3, 29 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4) 36 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7 (Supp. 1990) . . . 3, 21, 24, 30 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1989) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 1992) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1) (a) (1989) 32 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1 (1988) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14 (1988) 3, 10, 11 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Note, Tort Claims Against the State of Utah. 5 Utah L. Rev. 
233, 236-37 (1956) 27 
Prosser and Keaton, The Law of Torts, pp. 1043 & 1051 (5th 
ed. 1984) 28 
Restatement of Torts § 887, comment c (1939) 28 
S.B. No. 79, Utah 1993 General Session 12 
vi 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
MARY DAY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through the UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY; THE UTAH 
HIGHWAY PATROL; KEN COLYAR; 
SALEM CITY CORPORATION; a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah; BRAD JAMES; 
SPANISH FORK CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah; ED ASAY; 
PUBLIC ENTITIES 1-3; and 
JOHN DOES 1-8, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
BRIEF OF STATE APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon the Utah 
Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1992), 
providing for appellate jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and 
decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does 
not have original jurisdiction." 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the State should be subjected to liability 
for personal injuries caused by a collision with a vehicle whose 
driver was being pursued by a Utah Highway Patrol trooper for 
actual or suspected violations of the law. 
Case No. 920438 
Priority 15 
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This issue encompasses the following sub-issues: 
a. Whether a law enforcement officer pursuing a 
suspect owes a duty to protect third parties from harm 
from a collision with the pursued's vehicle, 
b. Whether the law enforcement officer's pursuit 
of a suspect is the legal cause of a collision with the 
vehicle driven by the suspect. 
2. Whether, even under a gross negligence standard, the 
trial court properly granted summary judgment to the State against 
Day on her claims for injuries arising from a collision with the 
Floyd vehicle. 
3. Whether the State defendants are, by statute, immune 
from liability for injuries arising from a collision with a vehicle 
under pursuit by a law enforcement officer? 
a. Whether Day's claims are governed by the 
statute in effect on the date of the accident, even though her 
notice of claim against the State was not deemed denied until after 
the statute was repealed. 
b. Whether the State is immune from liability for 
Day's claims even under the version of the statute in effect after 
her notice of claim against the State was deemed denied. 
4. Whether the statute granting governmental entities 
immunity from liability for claims arising from a collision with a 
vehicle under police pursuit deprived Day of a remedy protected by 
the open courts clause of the Utah Constitution. 
5. Whether the statute granting governmental entities 
2 
immunity from liability for claims arising from a collision with a 
vehicle under police pursuit violates the equal protection 
guarantee of the Utah Constitution. 
6, Whether the statute granting governmental entities 
immunity from liability for claims arising from a collision with a 
vehicle under police pursuit violates the due process clause of the 
Utah Constitution. 
7. Whether the State defendants are immune from 
liability for Day's claims under the discretionary function 
exception to the State's statutory waiver of immunity for 
negligence claims. 
Standard of Review: All of the above issues are 
questions of law, upon which the trial court's decisions are 
accorded no deference and are reviewed for correctness. Allen v. 
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co.. 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992) 
(reviewing summary judgment). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Determinative provisions are reproduced in Addendum D to 
this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final judgment dated August 13, 
1992 of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
the Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding, granting summary 
judgment to the City defendants on plaintiff's claims for personal 
injury and wrongful death arising from an automobile collision 
3 
involving a car that was being pursued by various law enforcement 
officers. Summary judgment had previously been granted on August 
12, 1992 to the State defendants on all of plaintiff's claims. 
Day's claims against Officers James and Asay in their personal 
capacities had been dismissed on July 15, 1992, and her claims 
against Trooper Colyar in his personal capacity had been dismissed 
on April 14, 1992. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff filed her complaint on October 23, 1991. The 
defendants answered the complaint, denying all material 
allegations, and discovery ensued. In December 1991, UHP Trooper 
Colyar filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground 
that he was immune from personal liability under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. In February 1992, all State defendants 
filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that, by statute, 
they were immune from liability for injuries caused by a collision 
with a vehicle operated by a suspect under pursuit and that they 
owed no duty to the plaintiff or her decedent to control the 
conduct of a fleeing suspect. In March 1992, Salem City police 
officer James and Spanish Fork police officer Asay filed a motion 
to dismiss plaintiff's claims against them. In April 1992, based 
upon Colyar's motion, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claims 
against Colyar in his personal capacity. In May 1992, all City 
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all of 
plaintiff's claims and the remaining State defendants filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that they were 
4 
immune from liability for plaintiff's claims under the 
discretionary function exception to the general statutory waiver of 
governmental immunity for negligence claims. In June 1992, with 
leave of court based upon the stipulation of the parties, plaintiff 
filed an amended complaint. In July 1992, the court granted 
James's and Asay's motion to dismiss. After full briefing and oral 
argument, the court granted remaining defendants' motions for 
summary judgment. The court entered an order dismissing the claims 
against the State defendants on August 12, 1992 and the claims 
against the City defendants on August 13, 1992. The notice of 
appeal was filed on September 10, 1992.l 
Statement of Facts 
For purposes of the State's motion for summary judgment, 
the following facts were undisputed and are set forth in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, the non-moving party. 
On March 18, 1991, at 6:01 p.m., a vehicle operated by 
Steven Edward Floyd ran a red light at the intersection of 
University Avenue and East Bay Boulevard in Provo, Utah, and 
collided with a vehicle in which Boyd K. and Mary Day were riding. 
R. 767. Mr. Day was killed and Mrs. Day seriously injured in the 
collision. At the time of the collision, Floyd was attempting to 
flee Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Ken Colyar. 
The pursuit had begun approximately 15 minutes earlier 
after Trooper Colyar attempted to stop the vehicle for a speeding 
*Plaintiff did not appeal the orders dismissing her claims 
against Colyar, James or Asay in their personal capacities. R. 
563. 
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violation on 1-15 near Santaquin, Utah. R. 628-33, 639-43. In 
response to those attempts, the vehicle, a black Buick Regal, sped 
up, exited the freeway at Santaquin, ran a stop sign at the bottom 
of the off-ramp and sped north on SR-6. R. 639-46. 
After Floyd ran the stop sign, Trooper Colyar turned on 
the overhead lights and siren on his marked patrol car, R. 643, 
647, and followed Floyd along SR-6, a two-lane rural highway, 
through the hamlets and small towns of Spring Lake, Payson, Salem 
and Spanish Fork. Trooper Colyar did not get close enough to read 
Floyd's license plate until two miles south of Payson. R. 640, 
860. 
The speeds of the two vehicles varied over the course of 
the pursuit. A top speed of 120 m.p.h. was reached at the 
beginning of the pursuit between the freeway and Spring Lake, R. 
651, but then varied between 60 and 110 m.p.h. on the open 
stretches of highway. R. 656, 660, 609, 929. The vehicles slowed 
to 30 m.p.h. for a 90 degree right-hand turn on Main Street in 
Payson and to as little as 15 or 20 m.p.h. at other times in the 
towns. R. 683, 929, 1050. Although speeds reached 65 m.p.h. in 
Spanish Fork, most of the time they were well below that. R. 770, 
771. 
Some of the traffic pulled off the road to get out of the 
way as the two vehicles approached. R. 1040, 1051-52. Floyd 
passed other vehicles on both the left and right, but slowed for 
traffic when necessary and, except for his speed, Trooper Colyar 
did not consider Floyd to be driving in an unsafe manner. R. 652, 
6 
665, 925. Trooper Colyar followed, but passed other vehicles only 
on the left. R. 663. 
There were no traffic lights in Spring City or Salem. 
The only traffic light in Payson was green when Floyd and Colyar 
passed through. With no other cars at either intersection, Floyd 
ran two red lights in Spanish Fork. R. 771. Trooper Colyar came 
to a complete stop at the first red light and allowed another car 
to pass through the intersection; the second light was green by the 
time Colyar reached it. R. 772. 
After leaving Spanish Fork, Floyd headed toward the 
freeway. R. 773. As he attempted to enter the on-ramp, Floyd's 
vehicle hit the front-end of a semi-truck, spun around and came to 
a stop. R. 773-75. Floyd then turned to go back up the on-ramp, 
while Trooper Colyar drove along the left side of Floyd's car, 
attempting to steer Floyd toward SR-114, where Utah County 
Sheriff's Deputies were setting up tire rippers. R. 775-76, 780, 
889, 949, 959, 965. Colyar was forced to back off, however, to 
avoid being rammed when Floyd swerved his car sideways toward 
Colyar. R. 776. Trooper Colyar considered ramming Floyd's car, 
but decided that the circumstances did not warrant the use of 
deadly force.2 R. 776, 790, 890. Floyd reentered the northbound 
interstate, where Colyar continued the pursuit, intending to keep 
Floyd in sight while tire rippers were set up ahead on the 
2The vehicle pursuit policy of the Department of Public Safety 
provided that w[t]he use of forcible stops such as roadblocks, 
ramming, boxing-in and channelization are a last resort measure and 
should be evaluated by the officer in a similar fashion as the use 
of deadly force." R. 425. 
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interstate. R. 776, 800, 803-04, 870, 966, 968. Although Floyd 
wove around traffic in all three lanes and occasionally used the 
emergency lane, Trooper Colyar remained in the left hand lane. R. 
788, 802-03. Floyd exited the freeway at University Avenue in 
Provo and collided with the Day vehicle. 
After the pursuit ended, Colyar confirmed that, as he had 
suspected, the vehicle driven by Floyd was stolen. R. 692, 862. 
Floyd, whose identity was unknown throughout the pursuit, R. 887, 
was identified as a 16-year-old runaway from a half-way house in 
Las Vegas, Nevada, where he had been serving probation for 
convictions of grand larceny, grand auto theft and burglary. R. 
1004. Floyd was convicted of manslaughter in the death of Mr. Day. 
R. 1085. 
Trooper Colyar had received training in high-speed 
driving techniques both in 1989 at the Peace Officer Standards & 
Training Academy and in July 1990 at the Utah Highway Patrol 
Mustang school. R. 590, 595. Colyar had also been trained on the 
Utah Department of Public Safety vehicle pursuit policies and 
procedures which had first been adopted in 1987 and were in effect 
in March 1991. R. 423-26, 598. Those policies were: 
It is the policy of the Department of Public 
Safety to identify and apprehend violators of 
the criminal law. Pursuit driving is 
necessitated by the suspects [sic] disregard 
for the law and the safety of others, and the 
responsibility charged to law enforcement 
officers to apprehend such persons. 
Sworn officers of the department shall conduct 
pursuits in compliance with Title 41-6-14 UCA, 
sound professional judgement and the 
procedures outlined in this policy. 
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The vehicle pursuit procedures provided, inter alia, that l![t]he 
initiating officer may terminate the pursuit when . . . [i]n the 
opinion of the pursuing officer(s) or a supervisor, the danger 
created by continuing the pursuit out weighs [sic] the need for an 
immediate apprehension." R. 423-26. A complete copy of the 
Department of Public Safety vehicle pursuit policy is set forth at 
Addendum E to this Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Day has no statutory right to recover against Trooper 
Colyar or the State for injuries resulting from the collision with 
the vehicle driven by Floyd, and sound public policy considerations 
weigh against conferring any such right as a matter of common law. 
Even if a gross negligence standard were applied, however, the 
trial court properly granted summary judgment on the ground that 
the undisputed facts taken in the light most favorable to Day were 
insufficient to support a finding that Trooper Colyar was grossly 
negligent in pursuing Floyd. Day's claims should not be submitted 
to a jury in any event because the State is immune from liability 
for injuries arising from the operation of an emergency vehicle. 
The law in effect on the date of Day's accident applies to her 
claims no matter when her notice of claim against the State was 
denied or deemed denied; however, even if the later version of the 
immunity act is applied, the State is immune. The statutory 
immunity for injuries arising out of the operation of emergency 
vehicles does not abrogate any of Day's rights under the open 
courts clause; nor does it violate equal protection or due process 
9 
principles. Finally, the State is also immune under the 
discretionary function exception to the statutory waiver of 
immunity for injuries caused by the negligence of a governmental 
employee. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TROOPER COLYAR HAD NO STATUTORY DUTY TO 
PROTECT THIRD PARTIES FROM FLOYD'S NEGLIGENCE 
OR RECKLESSNESS 
In arguing that the State should be held liable for the 
injuries caused by the collision, Day relies on the Utah Emergency 
Vehicle statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14 (1988) .3 That statute, 
however, merely provides a defense to a claim of liability, not a 
basis for a claim of liability in the first instance. The statute 
merely grants privileges and defines the scope of those privileges, 
leaving the question of the scope of the operator's affirmative 
duty to the courts to decide under the principles of common law. 
The statute provides: 
(1) The operator of an authorized 
3In the memoranda submitted below and Day's opening brief, the 
issue of whether Day had stated a valid prima facie claim was 
addressed in the context of determining whether the immunity 
statute deprived Day of a remedy protected by the open courts 
clause. This Court, however, has stated that the "proper mode of 
analysis is to first consider whether there is a legal theory upon 
which suit can be brought . . . before considering the separate and 
independent questions of whether the [defendant] is immune.11 
Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1162 n.3 (Utah 1991) 
(addressing the question of whether the defendants owed a duty to 
the plaintiff before reaching immunity issue). Therefore, the 
State defendants address this issue at the outset. 
10 
emergency vehicle,4 when responding to an 
emergency call or when in the pursuit of an 
actual or suspected violator of the law or 
when responding to but not upon returning from 
a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges 
under this section, subject to Subsection (2) . 
(2) The operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle may: 
(a) park or stand, irrespective of 
the provisions of this chapter; 
(b) proceed past a red or stop 
signal or stop sign, but only after 
slowing down as may be necessary for safe 
operation; 
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits 
if the operator does not endanger life or 
property; or 
(d) disregard regulations governing 
direction of movement or turning in 
specified directions. 
(3) Privileges granted under this 
section to an authorized emergency vehicle 
apply only when the vehicle sounds an audible 
signal under Section 41-6-146, or uses a 
visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-
132, which is visible from the front of the 
vehicle. 
(a) The privileges under this 
section do not relieve the operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle from the 
duty to operate the vehicle with regard 
for the safety of all persons, or protect 
the operator from the consequences of an 
arbitrary exercise of the privileges. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14 (1988) (emphasis added). Nothing in the 
above language imposes liability or suggests that it was intended 
to be applied as a remedial statute to impose an affirmative duty 
upon the operator of an emergency vehicle. Had the legislature 
intended to impose such a duty, it easily could have said so 
expressly. See Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 
^tah Code Ann. § 41-6-1 (1988) defines Authorized emergency 
vehicle" as "fire department vehicles, police vehicles, ambulances, 
and other publicly or privately owned vehicles as designated by the 
commissioner of the Department of Public Safety." 
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800, 804 (1941) (while the rule that statutes in derogation of 
common law must be strictly construed has been abrogated in this 
state, nevertheless, if the liability imposed on city by statute is 
limited to failure to keep its streets in repair and unobstructed, 
extension of liability further than clear intendment of statute is 
precluded); Stanton Transp. Co. v. Davis. 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 
207, 210 (1959) (statutes are to be liberally construed to give 
effect to their purpose and promote justice but they are not to be 
distorted beyond the intent of the legislature).5 
Contrary to Day's contention, no Utah case has construed 
section 41-6-14 to impose any duty upon a pursuing officer.6 
Although courts in other jurisdictions have construed their 
emergency vehicle statutes to impose a duty, those statutes are 
significantly different from section 41-6-14. Whereas section 41-
6-14(3) (a) states that the privileges do not relieve an emergency 
5Under a bill proposed in the current legislative session, S.B. 
No. 79, the phrase "if the operator does not endanger life or 
property" would be deleted from subsection 2(c) of section 41-6-14 
and subsection 3(a) would be entirely deleted. A new subsection 4 
would be added providing that the privileges granted to the 
operator of an emergency vehicle "involved in any vehicle pursuit" 
would apply only when (1) the operator sounds both audible and 
visual signals, (2) the public agency employing the operator has in 
effect a written vehicle pursuit policy, (3) the operator has been 
trained in accordance with the policy and (4) the policy conforms 
with standards established by the Department of Public Safety. If 
adopted, these amendments add further support to the State 
defendants' interpretation of this section. 
6The only language in the Utah cases cited by Day that appears 
to indicate to the contrary is in the concurring opinion of Justice 
Crockett in Cornwall v. Larsen. 571 P.2d 925, 929 (Utah 1977), in 
which he inaccurately restates Justice Ellett's concurring opinion 
as stating that the statute "imposes" the duty to exercise 
reasonable care. This language simply does not bear the weight Day 
attempts to place upon it. 
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vehicle operator "from the duty to operate the vehicle with regard 
for the safety of all persons, or protect the operator from the 
consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges," other 
statutes provide that the operator shall not be relieved of the 
duty to operate the vehicle with "due regard" and shall not be 
protected from the consequences of "reckless disregard" for the 
safety of others. See, e.g. . 47 Okla. Stat. 1981 § 11-106 (quoted 
in Kelly v. Citv of Tulsa. 791 P.2d 826, 827 (Okla. App. 1990)). 
The absence of recognized standard-of-care language from the Utah 
statute further evidences the legislature's intent to leave the 
duty question to the courts. Thus, the cases Day cites which rely 
upon the "due regard" or "reckless disregard" language in emergency 
vehicle statutes to find a duty are inapposite here. See, e.g. . 
Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor. 339 N.W.2d 413, 416-17 (Mich. 1983); 
Mason v. Bitton. 534 P.2d 1360, 1362 (Wash. 1975). 
Even where emergency vehicle statutes are construed to 
impose a duty on the operator, many courts have declined to extend 
that duty to the protection of third parties from the negligent or 
reckless conduct of a person under police pursuit. In Kelly v. 
City of Tulsa. 791 P.2d 826 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990), for example, the 
plaintiff sued Tulsa City for the wrongful death of his mother who 
was killed in a head-on collision with a vehicle driven by a 
suspected drunk driver being pursued at high speeds over surface 
streets by a city police officer. The plaintiff alleged that the 
city failed to properly train and supervise the officer, that the 
officer failed to comply with policies and procedures regarding 
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pursuit and that the officer operated his vehicle with reckless 
disregard for the decedent's safety. 
On appeal from a summary judgment for the city, the court 
analyzed the duty imposed by Oklahoma's emergency vehicle statute, 
stating: 
Plaintiff's theory of negligence is not 
based on the operation of an emergency 
vehicle. Raglund [the suspected drunk driver] 
did not accelerate because an emergency 
vehicle was being driven in an exempt manner. 
If a fire engine or ambulance had been 
speeding or running stop signals, he would 
likely have moved out of the way as required 
by law. Raglund accelerated because a police 
officer was signaling him to stop. 
Plaintiff's real objection is to [the 
officer's] decision to initiate and continue 
police pursuit. This is not the consideration 
addressed by sections 11-106 and -405. 
Id. at 828 (emphasis in original). Thus, "absent evidence that the 
emergency vehicle itself was being driven in an unsafe manner," the 
statute provided no basis for the city's liability. Id. See also 
Thornton v. Shore. 666 P.2d 655, 668 (Kan. 1983). 
Thus, Trooper Colyar had no duty under section 41-6-14 to 
protect third parties from the negligence or recklessness of Floyd. 
POINT II 
SOUND PUBLIC POLICY WEIGHS AGAINST IMPOSING 
LIABILITY ON A PURSUING OFFICER FOR INJURIES 
CAUSED BY A COLLISION WITH THE VEHICLE 
OPERATED BY THE PURSUED 
In arguing that the State should be held liable for the 
injuries caused by the collision with Floyd, Day overlooks a 
substantial body of authority holding that, for public policy 
reasons, a governmental entity or employee may not be held liable 
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for injuries caused by a person being pursued by a peace officer. 
Some courts address the issue as a proximate cause question; others 
analyze it as a question of duty. 
For example, having found no statutory duty, the court in 
Kelly v. City of Tulsa went on to address the proximate cause 
element of the plaintiff's claim: 
Second, we find that the officer's 
pursuit in this case was not, as a matter of 
law, the proximate cause of the accident. 
Where the facts of a case are undisputed, the 
issue of proximate cause is a question for the 
court. Again, the majority of jurisdictions 
addressing this issue refuse to impose 
liability on the officer for the independent 
acts of a law offender. The law allows police 
pursuit of fleeing violators as a matter of 
public policy; the benefit of apprehending 
these individuals outweighs the ordinary risks 
inherently involved in such pursuit. Unlike 
the cases relied upon by Plaintiff, the 
undisputed facts in this case show that 
Dunlap's pursuit was not so extreme or 
outrageous as to pose a higher threat to 
public safety than ordinarily incident to 
high-speed police pursuit. 
Id. at 829 (citations omitted). Thus, "the pursuit did not create 
a condition for which liability may be imposed.ff Id. 
The same conclusion was reached by the court in Thornton 
v. Shore. 666 P.2d 655 (Kan. 1983): 
The privileges and immunities granted to 
police officers under K.S.A. 8-1506 would 
indeed be hollow if the test of due care (or 
due regard as used in the statute) were 
extended to include the acts of the fleeing 
motorist whom the officer is trying to 
apprehend. The net effect of such an 
extension would be to make the officer the 
insurer of the fleeing violator, be he or she 
a mentally deranged person, prison escapee, 
murderer, drug addict or drunk. 
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Id. at 661-62. Perhaps more importantly, construing the emergency 
vehicle statute to impose liability for the conduct of the pursued 
would f,thwart the public policy purpose of the statute." Id. at 
667-68 (noting the "strong public policy to remove drunken drivers 
from Kansas roads"). 
Thus, the court affirmed a summary judgment dismissing 
the plaintiffs' claims for the wrongful death of two persons killed 
in a collision with a Jeep whose driver was being pursued after an 
officer had attempted to stop him for speeding. The driver was 
later determined to have consumed beer and smoked marijuana the 
evening before the early morning accident. Id. at 657-58. See 
also United States v. Hutchins. 268 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1959) 
(applying Tennessee law) (United States not liable for personal 
injuries sustained by 14-year-old passenger in vehicle operated by 
suspected drunk driver who collided with another vehicle while 
being pursued by federal law enforcement officers); State of West 
Virginia v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. . 263 F. Supp. 88, 90-91 
(D. W. Va. 1967) (applying West Virginia law) (absent evidence of 
"utter willful, reckless, disregard for the life and property of 
third parties," officer not liable for personal injuries caused by 
collision with stolen vehicle driven by prison escapee pursued at 
high-speeds through urban streets); Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk 
Co. . 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. App. 1952) (police officers not liable for 
personal injuries sustained by driver of milk truck in collision 
with vehicle under high-speed pursuit); Stanton v. State. 285 
N.Y.S.2d 964, 969-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), affirmed. 259 N.E.2d 
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494, 495 (NY 1970) (officer not liable for personal injuries caused 
by collision with vehicle driven at night without headlights while 
pursued at speeds exceeding 100 m.p.h. in southbound direction in 
northbound lane of highway); Lewis v. Bland. 599 N.E.2d 814, 815-17 
(Ohio App. 1991) (absent evidence of "willful or wanton" conduct, 
city of Akron not liable for personal injuries of driver and 
passenger sustained in collision vehicle operated by driver pursued 
at mid-day at high speeds through business and residential areas); 
Nevill v. City of Tullahoma. 756 S.W.2d 226, 233 (Term. 1986) 
(officers not liable for death of passenger in vehicle driven at 
night without headlights in high-speed pursuit on two-lane 
highway); Dent v. City of Dallas, 729 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1986), cert, denied. 485 U.S. 977 (1988) (police officers and 
city not liable for wrongful death of man killed in collision with 
vehicle whose driver was being pursued by police on suspicion of 
attempting to pass forged drug prescription); Dewald v. State. 719 
P.2d 643, 649-50 (Wyo. 1986) (absent evidence of "extreme and 
outrageous" conduct, patrolmen and State not liable for wrongful 
death resulting from collision with suspected drunk driver pursued 
during daytime at high speeds in downtown Laramie). 
As discussed in the above cases, sound public policy 
weighs against imposing liability upon the State for injuries 
caused by a collision with the vehicle of a suspect under pursuit 
by the police. Therefore, the summary judgment below should be 
affirmed. 
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POINT III 
EVEN UNDER A GROSS NEGLIGENCE STANDARD. THE 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST DAY ON HER CLAIMS ARISING FROM THE 
COLLISION WITH THE VEHICLE DRIVEN BY FLOYD 
Only a distinct minority of courts hold, as Day contends, 
that the officer in a pursuit should be subject to liability under 
a simple negligence or due care standard where the plaintiff's 
injuries are not directly caused by a collision with the officer's 
vehicle. Most of the cases cited by Day for the proposition that 
the officer may be held liable for such injuries apply a gross 
negligence standard. Furthermore, a striking number of those 
decisions are resolved as a matter of law in favor of the officer. 
In Peak v. Ratliff. 408 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 1991), for 
example, the plaintiffs sued for personal injuries sustained in a 
head-on collision with a stolen vehicle operated by a burglary 
suspect being pursued by a state trooper at high speeds on a "hilly 
and twisting" two-lane road passing residential areas, some 
businesses, a golf course and a school. The chase occurred at 5:30 
p.m. on a weekday and "although traffic on the day in question was 
not characterized as heavy, it appears that many people use 
Glenwood Road at that time of day on their way home from work." 
The trooper was aware of the identity of the suspect. The speed 
limit on the road was 35 m.p.h., except in several straight 
stretches where the limit was 45 m.p.h., and the pursuit took place 
at speeds between 60 and 100 m.p.h. Before the collision which 
ended the chase, the suspect was observed by the trooper to pass 
18 
other vehicles in blind curves and force oncoming traffic off the 
road, "On such occasions, the officers slowed down and waited for 
preceding traffic to move to the side of the road before continuing 
the chase." Id. at 309. 
Instructed on a standard of "reckless disregard or gross 
negligence,n the jury found liability. The trial court, however, 
granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. On appeal, the court held that the trial court properly 
instructed the jury on the standard of care and affirmed the 
judgment of dismissal on the ground that the officers' conduct did 
not constitute gross negligence as a matter of law. Id. at 310. 
Similarly, in Boyer v. State. 594 A.2d 121 (Md. 1991), 
the court upheld the trial court's partial summary judgment against 
the plaintiffs on their theory that the pursuing state trooper was 
negligent in the manner in which he pursued the suspected drunk 
driver whose vehicle had collided with their parents' vehicle, 
killing them both. The plaintiffs claimed that the trooper had 
pursued the suspect "through heavy traffic and numerous 
intersections" at speeds in excess of 100 m.p.h. The court held 
that the trooper's alleged conduct "did not amount to gross 
negligence as a matter of law." l£l. at 132. 
Addressing the plaintiffs' claims that the trooper was 
negligent in deciding to pursue and continuing to pursue the 
suspect, the court again adopted a gross negligence standard. Id. 
at 135. Because the motions for summary judgment did not raise the 
sufficiency of the allegations to show a breach of that duty, the 
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court remanded the case to the trial court to consider that issue. 
In so doing, however, the court concluded with the following 
comments for the "guidance11 of the trial court. 
It must be remembered that the police 
officer's conduct should be judged not by 
hindsight but should be viewed in the light of 
how a reasonably prudent police officer would 
respond faced with an emergency situation. 
* * * 
Very often when a breach of the police 
officer's duty is found in high speed chase 
cases like the present, there are particular 
aggravating circumstances, such as a violation 
of police department policies or guidelines, 
failure to turn on warning devices, extremely 
high speeds in congested areas, or other 
factors. There are, however, no hard rules in 
this area, and each case depends upon its own 
facts. 
Id. at 137. See also West v. United States. 617 F. Supp. 1015, 
1017-18 (D.C. Cal. 1985) (granting summary judgment for defendants 
where high-speed chase occurred on freeway); Breck v. Cortez. 490 
N.E.2d 88, 94 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (sustaining summary judgment for 
defendants in nighttime chase ending with fatal crash after suspect 
vehicle left interstate and drove on curving wet road without 
headlights); Bullins v. Schmidt. 369 S.E.2d 601 (N.C. 1988) 
(reversing judgment based on jury verdict against defendants in 
high-speed nighttime chase of suspected drunk driver, who drove 
with only parking lights on, for 14 minutes and 18 miles, ending 
with head-on collision, killing both drivers). 
Applying a gross negligence standard here, the undisputed 
facts justify summary judgment in favor of Trooper Colyar. Trooper 
Colyar's decision to continue to follow Floyd, keeping him in sight 
while other law enforcement officers were setting up tire rippers 
in an effort to safely stop the pursuit, was not grossly negligent. 
Although reaching high-speeds at various times, the danger involved 
in the pursuit did not clearly exceed the legitimate need to 
immediately apprehend Floyd, who Colyar reasonably suspected of 
having engaged in conduct considerably more serious than a speeding 
violation. The fact that the pursuit ended tragically should not 
be used in hindsight to judge the risk involved in the pursuit. 
Until immediately before the collision, Trooper Colyar had no 
reason to foresee that Floyd was likely to act so recklessly as to 
run a red light with another vehicle entering the intersection. 
The risk involved in this pursuit was no greater than the risk 
ordinarily involved in a high-speed pursuit. Therefore, the trial 
court's decision granting summary judgment to the State defendants 
should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE STATE IS IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY 
FOR DAY'S CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 7 OF 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Section 7 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("Act") , 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 to -38 (1989 & Supp. 1990), provides: 
(2) (a) All governmental entities 
employing peace officers retain and do not 
waive immunity from liability for civil 
damages for personal injury or death or for 
damages to property resulting from the 
collision of a vehicle being operated by an 
actual or suspected violator of the law who is 
being, has been, or believes he is being or 
has been pursued by a peace officer employed 
by the governmental entity in a motor vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7(2) (a) (Supp. 1990) . This section squarely 
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fits Day's claims. 
In an attempt to avoid the effect of section 7, Day 
argues that section 7 does not apply here because it was repealed 
effective April 29, 1991 and her cause of action did not arise 
until sometime thereafter when her claim was denied or deemed 
denied by the State in accordance with section 14 the Act. This 
argument is spurious. 
Contrary to Day's contention, a "cause of action for 
personal injury generally accrues when the accident occurs." 
Jackson v. Layton City. 743 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1987) (Howe, J., 
concurring). See also Jepson v. State, 205 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 34-
35 (Utah Ct. App. January 27, 1993); Fields v. Mountain States Tel. 
& Tel. Co.. 754 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In an action 
for personal injuries, the accident is "the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action." Myers v. McDonald. 635 P.2d 84, 86 
(Utah 1981) . Thus, Day's cause of action arose on the date of her 
accident, March 18, 1991, and section 7 applies to her claims. 
Day cites sections 11, 15 and 16 of the Act in support of 
the proposition that her claims did not become remediable in the 
courts until after they were denied or deemed denied by the State. 
This proposition is incorrect. 
Section 11 requires that a written notice of claim be 
filed "before maintaining an action" against a governmental entity 
or employee. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1989). This requirement 
is a jurisdictional prerequisite only -- not an element of a cause 
of action. The filing of the notice of claim is an event entirely 
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within the control of the plaintiff and theoretically can occur 
even on the date of the accident itself. 
Section 15(1) provides that "if the claim is denied, a 
claimant may institute an action in the district court against the 
governmental entity." (Emphasis added.) Section 16 requires that 
such an action be commenced within one year of when the claim is 
denied or deemed denied. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15(1) & -16 
(1989). Nothing in the express language of these provisions 
supports Day's contention that an action against the State cannot 
be commenced until after the claim has been denied or deemed 
denied by the State. 
Nor have these provisions been so interpreted by this 
Court. In Johnson v. State Retirement Office. 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 
1980), the plaintiffs filed their original complaint on the same 
day as the notice of claim. This Court reversed the district 
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims, holding that "The 
filing of the original complaint on the same day as the notice of 
claim did not nullify the effect of the notice of claim." Id. at 
1236. 
Thus, a claim for personal injuries against the State is 
"remediable" from the date of the accident simply upon the filing 
of a notice of claim. Day's cause of action against the State 
arose on the date of the collision and section 7 of the Act applies 
to her claims. 
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POINT V 
THE STATE IS IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR DAY'S 
CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 10(15) OF THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Even under the law in effect after the repeal of Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-7, the State is immune from liability for Day's 
claims. Day correctly notes that upon the repeal of section 7, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(15) was enacted, which waives immunity 
for injuries caused by employee negligence, "except if the injury-
arises out of . . . the operation of an emergency vehicle while 
being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-
14." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(15) (Supp. 1992). 
Because section 63-30-10(15) contains no specific 
provision comparable to section 63-30-7(2)(a), expressly retaining 
immunity for injuries caused by a collision with a vehicle operated 
by a person under police pursuit, Day argues that such immunity no 
longer exists under subsection 10(15). This argument, however, 
ignores section 63-30-7(2) (b) , which provides that the " [e]nactment 
of this subsection [63-30-7(2)1 does not state nor imply that this 
immunity was ever previously waived or this liability specifically 
or implicitly recognized." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7(2)(b) (Supp. 
1990). Just as the enactment of section 7(2) does not imply that 
liability previously existed, neither does its repeal imply that 
liability has been reinstated. 
The provisions of section 7 in effect before the 
enactment of subsection (2) , construed according to their plain and 
ordinary meaning, encompassed all claims for injuries arising out 
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of the operation of emergency vehicles, including those involving 
collisions with vehicles under police pursuit. The enactment of 
subsection (2) was expressly not intended to change the existing 
law concerning such collisions, but only to clarify the legislative 
intent in the face of a perceived legal trend in California to 
assert claims for injuries arising from such collisions. See 
Senate debate, Senator Richard J. Carling, S.B. 194, February 14, 
1990. 
Thus, contrary to Day's contention, the law concerning 
liability for injuries caused by such collisions has remained the 
same since the original enactment of section 63-30-7 in 1965. 
Under that law, the State is immune from liability for Day's 
claims. 
POINT VI 
SECTION 7 COMPORTS WITH THE OPEN 
COURTS CLAUSE 
A. Section 7 Did Not Deprive Day Of A Remedy Against 
The State 
1. The State Was Absolutely Immune From Tort 
Liability At Common Law7 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act broadened the 
liability of governmental entities. See Standiford v. Salt Lake 
City. 605 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Utah 1980) (recognizing principle) . 
Before the Act's adoption, however, the State was absolutely immune 
from tort liability at common law. See Wilkinson v. State. 134 P. 
7Subsections 1 and 2 of this Point essentially reiterate, in 
abbreviated form, the arguments that were made by the appellants 
and the State in Hipwell v. Sharp. No. 920218, which is currently 
under advisement by this Court. 
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626, 630 (Utah 1913) (flin the absence of either express 
constitutional or statutory authority an action against a sovereign 
state cannot be maintained"); Campbell Bldg. Co, v. State Road 
Comm'n. . 70 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1937) ("action may not be 
maintained [against the State Road Commission] unless the State 
has, through legislative or constitutional action, given consent to 
be sued"); State v. District Court. 78 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1937) 
("the state cannot be sued unless it has given its consent or has 
waived immunity"); Bingham v. Board of Education. 223 P.2d 432, 435 
(Utah 1950) ("without legislative enactment we are unable to impose 
any liability or obligation upon [departments of the state]"). 
Thus, in immunizing the State from liability for injuries 
resulting from collisions between a violator being pursued by a 
peace officer and a third party, section 7 did not deprive Day of 
any remedy she would have been provided at common law. 
2. The Proprietary/Governmental Function 
Distinction Does Not Apply To The State 
In arguing that she was deprived of a remedy protected by 
the open courts clause, Day relies on Condemarin v. University 
Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), in which this Court held 
unconstitutional the damages cap provision of the Act as applied to 
the University Hospital. In Condemarin, the plurality determined 
that in rendering medical treatment to the plaintiff the Hospital 
was performing a "proprietary," rather than "governmental" 
function, and therefore would have been fully liable at common law 
for the plaintiffs' resulting injuries. Id. at 353. Based upon 
that determination, the plurality held that the damages cap 
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provision deprived the plaintiffs of a remedy protected by the open 
courts clause and applied a heightened scrutiny in testing the 
constitutionality of the provision. Id. at 356, 368, 373. Justice 
Durham found that the caps violated both the equal protection and 
due process guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. Id. 
at 364. Justices Zimmerman and Stewart concurred in part based on 
due process and equal protection grounds, respectively. Id. at 
366-69, 369-75. 
In applying the proprietary/governmental function 
distinction to a State entity in Condemarin. however, the plurality 
erred. At common law, that distinction was applied only to 
municipal corporations, which were regarded as having a dual 
character and were accorded immunity only when acting as an agent 
of the state, i.e., in a governmental capacity, rather than as a 
private corporation, i.e., in a proprietary capacity. See Note, 
Tort Claims Against the State of Utah. 5 Utah L. Rev. 233, 236-37 
(1956); Crowder v. Salt Lake County. 552 P.2d 646, 647 (Utah 1976) 
("prior to 1965, actions for negligence could not have been 
maintained against the State or its political subdivisions for any 
injury caused by a defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any 
road or bridge except municipalities"); Bingham v. Board of 
Education. 223 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1950) (recognizing dual 
character of municipal corporations and stating that w [i] f the city 
should be regarded as a state agency at all times, . . . there 
would exist no logical ground for holding it liable for damages due 
to negligence, since in no instance is a state held liable under 
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the general principles of law"). See also Hale v. Port of 
Portland. 783 P.2d 506 (Or. 1989) (holding damages cap conflicted 
with state open courts provision as applied to municipality, but 
not as applied to state) ; Prosser and Keaton# The Law of Torts, pp. 
1043 & 1051 (5th ed. 1984) (at common law state entities were 
absolutely immune from suit, while municipalities were granted 
immunity only for governmental, as opposed to proprietary, 
activities); Restatement of Torts § 887, comment c (1939) (only the 
state has complete immunity from tort liability; municipal 
corporations are immune only for governmental functions).8 
Thus, to the extent Condemarin applied the 
proprietary/governmental function distinction to a state entity in 
concluding that the plaintiffs were "deprived of a remedy protected 
by the open courts clause, it should not be followed here. The 
Department of Public Safety and the Utah Highway Patrol are clearly 
state entities and, as such, would have been accorded absolute 
immunity at common law from Day's claims. Therefore, section 7 
does not abrogate any common law remedy that would have been 
available to Day and fully comports with the open courts clause. 
3. Trooper Colyar Was Engaged In A Governmental 
Function In Pursuing Floyd 
Even applying the proprietary/governmental function 
distinction to the State entities here, Day had no common law 
remedy against them. In Standiford v. Salt Lake City. 605 P.2d 
1230, 1236-37 (Utah 1980), this Court defined governmental function 
Additional case authorities are cited at pp. 14 - 15 of the 
Brief of Appellant Roger Sharp in Hipwell v. Sharp. No. 920218. 
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as an activity lfof such a unique nature that it can only be 
performed by a governmental agency or that is essential to the core 
of governmental activity."9 In pursuing Floyd, a suspected 
violator of the law, Colyar was performing the function of law 
enforcement, an activity clearly "essential to the core of 
governmental activity." See Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 
P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1989) (noting that law enforcement is a "'core' 
or 'essential' function of government" under Standiford 
definition). Since Colyar was performing a "governmental 
function" when he was pursuing Floyd, the State would have been 
immune at common law for injuries resulting from the pursuit. 
Thus, Day was not deprived of any remedy she would have been 
afforded at common law and section 7 fully comports with the open 
courts clause. 
4. The Open Courts Clause Does Not Protect Any 
Statutory Remedy Abrogated By Section 7 
In arguing that section 7 violates the open courts 
clause, Day relies solely upon section 41-6-14 in contending that 
she otherwise had a remedy for injuries arising from the collision 
9In Standiford. the Court interpreted the term "governmental 
function" as it appeared in section 63-30-3 of the pre-1987 version 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The version of the Act in 
effect at the time Day's claims arose, however, expressly defined 
the term "governmental function" as "any act, failure to act, 
operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity, 
whether or not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or 
undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core 
governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual 
capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or 
governmental function, or could be performed by private enterprise 
or private persons." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1989) (see 
Addendum D) . Clearly, Colyar's pursuit of Floyd was a governmental 
function under this definition. 
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with the Floyd vehicle. The scope of rights protected by the open 
courts clause, however, does not include statutory remedies or 
remedies not in existence at the time the open courts clause was 
adopted. As stated by this Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. . 
717 P.2d 670, 676 n.3 (Utah 1985), "the common law at the time of 
statehood provides a measure of the kinds of legal remedies that 
the framers must have had in mind (at least in scope if not in 
form) for the protection of life, property, and reputation." 
Section 41-6-14 was originally enacted in 1955, long after 
statehood. Thus, it was entirely within the legislature's 
prerogative to abrogate any right Day may have had to recover for 
her injuries under that section. 
5. Day Has Cited No Authority To Show That She Had A 
Right Protected By The Open Courts Clause 
Day has cited no authority whatsoever for the proposition 
that she had a legal remedy for her injuries against the State at 
common law at the time of statehood. Thus, she has failed to 
demonstrate any right to recover that is protected by the open 
courts clause and the trial court properly granted summary judgment 
to the State. 
POINT VII 
SECTION 7 COMPORTS WITH BOTH EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS 
PRINCIPLES 
Day posits that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7(2) (a) creates an 
unconstitutional classification (1) between persons whose claims 
arose during its effective period and those whose claims arose 
either before subsection (2)(a) was enacted or after section 7's 
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repeal, and (2) between persons injured in police pursuits and 
those who are injured by other emergency vehicles. This argument 
fails for several reasons. 
First, neither of the above two classifications exists. 
As discussed in Point V, neither the enactment of subsection 
(2) (a) , nor the repeal of section 63-30-7 effected any change in 
the law. Thus, the law has uniformly applied to all persons since 
the original enactment of section 63-30-7 in 1955. Moreover, the 
immunity granted by the pre-1990 version of section 63-30-7, the 
pre-1991 version of that section, and section 63-30-10(15), 
encompasses all injuries arising from the operation of an emergency 
vehicle, no matter whether the claim involved a police pursuit. 
Thus, none of the three versions of statutory immunity for injuries 
arising from the operation of an emergency vehicle makes any 
distinction between those injured in police pursuits and those 
injured by other emergency vehicles. 
Even if the classifications Day theorizes did exist, 
Day's equal protection and due process challenges fail. Based on 
Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), Day 
contends that the usual presumption of constitutionality does not 
apply to section 63-30-7(2) (a) and that the burden of demonstrating 
the constitutionality of the statute is with the State. In 
Condemarin. however, the basis for applying heightened scrutiny and 
shifting the presumption of constitutionality was the abrogation of 
rights protected by the open courts clause. Id. at 357, 368 & 373. 
As discussed in Point VI above, section 7 does not abrogate Day's 
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rights under the open courts clause. Therefore, the presumption of 
constitutionality applies, the constitutionality of section 7 is 
properly measured under a minimum scrutiny test and the burden 
remains on Day to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the 
immunity provision. 
Moreover, the constitutionality of section 63-30-7 must 
be determined based upon an analysis of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act as a whole, the overall effect of which is to broaden 
the remedies of persons injured in governmental torts. Day has not 
undertaken such an analysis in her brief and therefore has failed 
to meet her burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the 
immunity granted by section 63-30-7. 
POINT VIII 
DAY'S CLAIMS FALL WITHIN THE 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION TO 
THE STATE'S WAIVER OF IMMUNITY FOR 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS 
Section 63-30-10(1) (a) of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act waives immunity for injuries caused by employee negligence, 
"except if the injury arises out of . . . the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function, whether or not the discretion is abused." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10(1) (a) (1989) (effective July 1, 1990). 
In applying this subsection, this Court has followed the 
lead of federal cases interpreting a similar provision in the 
Federal Tort Claims Act. See Little v. Utah State Div. of Family 
Services. 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983); Frank v. State. 613 P.2d 
517, 519 (Utah 1980) . Thus, in Little, this Court drew a line 
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"between those functions ascribable to the policy making level and 
those to the operational levelff and held that although the decision 
to place an autistic child in foster care may have been 
discretionary, the supervision of the child's placement was 
unrelated to that policy decision and was therefore not protected 
by discretionary function immunity. "[T]he question was no longer 
whether the child was to receive foster care but whether due care 
was exercised under a duty assumed . . . . * * * Negligence under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act has been consistently held actionable 
where the conduct involved a non-discretionary duty to perform a 
professional function unrelated to policy decisions. " 667 P.2d at 
51-52 (emphasis added). 
Again applying the discretionary function exception in 
Doe v. Arauelles. 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985), this Court held that 
the decision of the superintendent of a state youth detention 
center to place a juvenile sex offender into the community was a 
"decision of judgment, planning, or policy," and as such "f [alls] 
into the category of functions designed to be shielded under the 
discretionary function exception." I£. at 282. Stating, however, 
that the superintendent's acts implementing the policy "must be 
considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they are 
ministerial and thereby outside the immunity protections," the 
Court held that the superintendent was not immune for his alleged 
negligent monitoring of the treatment that had been prescribed as 
a condition of the release. Xfl. at 283. This holding was 
consistent with Little's holding that implemental acts fall outside 
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the discretionary function exception where they are unrelated to 
the initial policy decision. 
Day's First Amended Complaint set forth three causes of 
action against the State and two against Trooper Colyar. The 
claims against the State were for (1) negligence in developing 
appropriate procedures for high-speed pursuits, (2) negligence in 
the training of law enforcement officers in high-speed pursuit 
procedures, and (3) negligent supervision of Trooper Colyar's 
pursuit of Floyd. The claims against Trooper Colyar were (1) 
negligence, and (2) gross negligence and careless and reckless 
disregard, in deciding to pursue, the manner of pursuing, and in 
deciding to continue to pursue Floyd. R. 467-82. 
Applying the above principles to Day's claims, the 
conduct of the Department of Public Safety and the Utah Highway 
Patrol in developing policies and procedures for high-speed 
pursuits was clearly discretionary in nature. Absent any evidence 
that those agencies were negligent in implementing their 
established policies and procedures, their conduct in training law 
enforcement officers concerning high-speed pursuits and in 
supervising Trooper Colyar's pursuit of Floyd was also 
discretionary and thus shielded from liability. Unlike the failure 
of the superintendent in Argue lies to carry out his policy decision 
that the juvenile offender should receive certain treatment as a 
condition of his release from the detention center into the 
community, there is no evidence that the State agencies here failed 
to implement any aspect of their high-speed pursuit policy in 
34 
training and supervising Trooper Colyar. 
Under the principles established in Little and Arguelles. 
the State is also immune from any liability based upon Trooper 
Colyar's conduct. Colyar's conduct in deciding to pursue, 
pursuing, and continuing to pursue Floyd was intimately related to 
the vehicle pursuit policies and procedures of the Department of 
Public Safety. In fact# in adopting those policies and procedures, 
the Department consciously vested a high degree of discretion in 
the individual law enforcement officer in a pursuit or potential 
pursuit situation.10 
This Court, in Little, held that to posit immunity on 
such an exercise of discretion, the State "must make a showing that 
a conscious balancing of risks and advantages took place." 667 
P.2d at 51. The record shows that both the Department of Public 
Safety in adopting its vehicle pursuit policy and Trooper Colyar in 
his decisions regarding the pursuit of Floyd made such a balancing 
decision. R. 407-410; 605, 664-665, 784. Absent any evidence that 
Trooper Colyar failed to implement the decisions resulting from 
that balancing process, his decisions and conduct in the pursuit of 
Floyd fall within the ambit of the discretionary function 
exception. 
In arguing that the discretionary function exception does 
10The United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that 
the status of the actor governs the application of the 
discretionary function exception. "[I]t is the nature of the 
conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether 
the discretionary function exception applies in a given case." 
United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varia 
Airlines). 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984). 
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not apply, Day distinguishes between "policies" and "procedures." 
This distinction is purely semantic and has no legal significance 
whatsoever. The fact that the Department labeled certain portions 
of its vehicle pursuit policy "procedures," is irrelevant to the 
determination of whether the State defendants were engaged in a 
discretionary function in carrying out that policy. As shown 
above, under the principles of Little and Arcruelles. Day's claims 
fall within the discretionary function exception regardless of 
whether the State defendants viewed themselves as carrying out 
policies or procedures.11 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the judgment of the district court 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^^juky of February, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
tyiz^ 
DEBRA 
AssistaAtf Attorney General 
nDay's reliance on the discretionary/ministerial function 
distinction is misplaced. That doctrine applies only to official 
immunity and was supplanted by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4), 
granting employees immunity except in cases of fraud or malice. 
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EXHIBITS 
EXHIBIT A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY DAY, individually and as : MINUTE ENTRY 
sole surviving heir to BOYD K. 
DAY, deceased, : Case No. 910906650 PI 
Plaintiff, : JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al., : 
Defendants• : 
The Court having considered the motions argued to the Court 
on July 7, 1992 as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed 
January 23, 1992; 
2. The State's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed 
February 14, 1992; 
3. The plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment RE: Discretionary Function Matters filed April 14, 
1992; and 
4. The State defendant's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Regarding High Speed Chase Policy filed May 8, 1992 and 
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now being fully advised in the premises now makes this its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
denied. The Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff's 
argument that the same is inapplicable because the legislature 
latter amended the statute to remove the blanket immunity 
provided for in Section 63-30-7(2) is not well taken. The fact 
that the legislature saw fit to amend this statute shortly after 
the accident herein occured does not change the fact that such 
was the law at the time of the accident and the Court does not 
find therefrom or for any of the other reasons raised by the 
plaintiff that the statute was either inapplicable or 
unconstitutional. Under the circumstances the Motion must be 
denied. In addition the Court does not find that the provisions 
of Section 63-30-10(15) as enacted by the legislature in 1991 
gives the plaintiff any more comfort. The Court is of the 
opinion that the officer who engages in a pursuit pursuant to an 
established policy and simply exercises his best judgment in 
regard to how to perform that pursuit as long as it is within a 
reasonable intrepretation of the policy is exercising a 
discretionary and not a ministerial duty. The Court further 
finds that the provisions of 63-30-7(2) were not 
unconstitutional and that the open Court provision was not 
violated by said statute. The argument of plaintiff that the 
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plaintiff was prevented from using the Courts in this case 
because the police cannot be sued in their individual capacity 
thus she has no remedy does not mean that the statute has 
prevented the plaintiff from using the Courts. It simply means 
that under the circumstances of this case the plaintiff has no 
rememdy as against the State or the municipalities involved. It 
is not unusual in our system of jurisprudence nor our society 
for relief not to be afforded to each and every person who might 
have some involvement with a particular mishap. Further the 
Court finds that it does not violate the equal protection 
provisions of either the State or Federal constitution, the 
claim being by the plaintiff that she is a class of one to whom 
this statute is applied and that the legislature after realizing 
it made a mistake changed the law and thus created her class and 
did not afford her equal protection. There simply is nothing in 
the record to indicate that this is the only individual who ever 
was effected by the operation of the statute above cited before 
it was amended nor does that necessarily mean even if she was 
that she was not afforded equal protection under the law. The 
time measured must be during the period of time that the statute 
is in eefect not from the beginning of time to the end of time. 
Insofar as the plaintiff's argument that the statute 
violates fundamental unfairness the Court simply does not find 
that to be the case. It applied while in affect to all persons 
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across the board and it had a valid reason for the exemption 
afforded therein. 
Turning to the second motion, the State's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Motion will be granted for the reasons set forth 
above, the same arguments apply to both motions. 
Matter number 3, the plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment RE: The Discretionary Function, has 
already been noted as above the Court finding that Section 
63-30-10(15) is not applicable herein by reason that the 
function of the highway patrolman herein fits squarely within 
the provisions of Section 63-30-10(15) and further the Court 
finds that the operation of the vehicle by the highway patrolman 
was in conformity with Section 41-6-14. That Section in 
providing that an officer may operate a vehicle in certain ways 
which otherwise would be violation of the law does not refer to 
his causing the operator of a pursued vehicle to exceed those 
limits and thus make the officer or his employer liable. To do 
so would be to say that if an officer observed an automobile 
being operated in an unsafe manner such that bystanders would be 
endangered if it continued in that fashion he would not be able 
to pursue if the driver continued to operate in that manner 
except under penalty of being held liable for damages caused by 
the errant driver. To place the interpretation on these two 
statutes requested by the plaintiff would be to provide a 
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convenient loop hole for any escaping felon by his simply 
driving at a high rate of speed through a congested area thus 
requiring the officer to break off pursuit for fear that the 
fleeing felon might cause injury or damage for which the officer 
or his employer might subsequently be held liable. 
In addition the Court finds that there is no causation 
between the actions of the officers of Salem City Corporation 
and Spanish Fork City Corporation and that the Motions for 
Summary Judgment as to those corporations should likewise be 
granted. 
Counsel for the defendant will prepare an appropriate 
summary judgment with appropriate supporting findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. 
DATED this day of July, 1992. */ 
C0053 
EXHIBIT B 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312 
Attorney General 
REED M. STRINGHAM - 4679 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State Defendants 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
RLS3 BSS73J3T G9UKT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 1 2 1992 
puty Clark 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY DAY, individually 
and as sole surviving 
heir to BOYD K. DAY, 
deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through THE UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY; THE UTAH HIGHWAY 
PATROL; KEN COLYAR; SALEM 
CITY CORPORATION, a 
municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah; BRAD 
JAMES; SPANISH FORK CITY 
CORPORATION, municipal 
corporation of the State 
of Utah; ED ASAY; and 
Public Entities 1-3; and 
JOHN DOES 1-8, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING STATE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910906650PI 
Judge Richard Moffat 
Defendants State of Utah, Utah Department of Public 
Safety, Utah Highway Patrol and Ken Colyar (State defendants) 
moved for summary judgment on the ground of governmental immunity 
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7(2). State defendants also moved 
for partial summary judgment as to their high speed pursuit 
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policy on the ground of governmental immunity under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10(1). The parties filed supporting and opposing 
memoranda amd an affidavit, smd the Court ordered the publication 
smd filing of all depositions tsiken in connection with this 
action, particularly the depositions of Trooper Kenneth Colyar 
and Steven Edward Floyd. The Court heard argument on July 7, 
1992. 
The Court finds that Utah Code Ann. § €3-30-7(2): 
1. Confers blanket immunity on State defendants from 
liability for civil damages for personal injury or death 
resulting from the collision of a vehicle being operated by an 
actual or suspected violator of the law who is being, has been or 
believes he is being or has been pursued by a peace officer; 
2. Was in effect at the time plaintiff's claims arose 
smd is applicable to said claims; 
3. Validly expresses the appropriate public policy of 
the State of Utah; 
4. Does not violate any provisions of the Utah State 
Constitution or Federal Constitution. 
The Court further finds that Trooper Kenneth Colyar 
operated his vehicle at all times in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-14. 
The Court further finds that Trooper Colyar reasonably 
complied with established State pursuit policy, the enactment of 
which is a discretionary function, and thus State defendants are 
entitled to discretionary function immunity. 
2 
For the above reasons, IT IS ORDERED: 
1. State defendants' motion for partial summary 
judgment regarding high speed pursuit policy is granted; 
2. State defendants' motion for summary judgment is 
granted; 
3. Summary judgment is entered in favor of State 
defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause of action, State 
defendants to recover their costs. 
DATED this / X day of August, 1992. 
— / 
BY THE CODRT: ** 
-RICHflRD H.£M(*r££tf-*_«\ ^  
District CteuiK^^f J ; 
MAILING CERTIFICATE \*%>S5^\ P 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correcftrs-copy 
Of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT this . y&~ day of August, 1992, to the 
following: 
Allan L. Larson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Larry Keller 
Attorney at Law 
257 East 200 South - 10 #340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
4tU W 
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EXHIBIT C 
lUiyC»f 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY DAY, individually and as 
sole surviving heir to BOYD K. 
DAY, deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through THE UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY; THE UTAH 
HIGHWAY PATROL; KEN COLYAR; 
SALEM CITY CORPORATION, a 
municipal corporation of the State 
of Utah; BRAD JAMES; SPANISH 
FORK CITY CORPORATION, muni-
cipal corporation of the State of 
Utah; ED AS AY; and Public 
Entities 1-3; and JOHN DOES 1-8, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910906650PI 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of the defendants Salem City Corporation, 
a municipal corporation of the State of Utah, Brad James, Spanish Fork City 
Corporation, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah, and Ed Asay, and the 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of the plaintiff coming on regularly for 
hearing before The Honorable Richard H. Moffat on July 7, 1992, and the parties 
having previously filed their respective Memoranda of Points and Authorities in 
support of and in opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment, and the Court 
having ordered the filing and publication of all depositions taken in connection 
with this matter, and the Court having reviewed the depositions, affidavits, 
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memoranda and pleadings on file herein, and argument having been heard, and the 
Court being fully advised in the premises, and the Court specifically finding and 
being of the opinion: 
1. At the time of this accident there was in effect Section 63-30-7(2) of 
the Utah Code, which provided blanket immunity to the moving defendants for civil 
damages for personal injury or death resulting from the collision of a vehicle being 
operated by a violator of the law who is being pursued by a peace officer. The 
Court is of the opinion that said statute was a valid expression by the Utah 
Legislature of appropriate public policy of the State of Utah, that said section 
was in effect at the time of the subject accident, is applicable to the plaintiff's 
claims herein, and that the said statute is not violative of any provision of the 
Utah State or Federal Constitution. 
2. There was no evidence developed or presented by the plaintiff, and 
there is thus no material issue of fact as to whether the conduct of Officers James 
and Asay (employees of Salem City and Spanish Fork City, respectively) were in 
any way in violation of the Emergency Vehicle Statute, Section 41-6-14, Utah 
Code. 
3. Plaintiff presented no evidence that the acts of Officers James and 
Asay in any way caused or contributed to the pursuit of Mr. Floyd by Trooper 
Colyar, or that their acts in any way caused or contributed to the ultimate 
unfortunate accident involving Mr. Floyd's vehicle and that of the plaintiffs. 
Indeed, the evidence, by the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Floyd himself, is to 
the contrary, that is , that the acts, such as they were, of Officers James and 
Asay were collateral, remote, and insignificant, and they were thus not the cause 
- 2 -
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in fact of the event of which plaintiff complains. Plaintiff has failed to establish 
one of the key elements of a negligence action, that is, cause in fact. 
4. Even if the actions of the officers in some way influenced the conduct 
of Mr. Floyd and thus could be found to have been a "cause in fact11 of the pursuit 
and the ultimate collision, the Court is of the opinion that the acts of Officers 
James and Asay were discretionary, and in any event were not the proximate 
cause, the sole proximate cause of the collision as a matter of law being the 
reckless and negligent conduct of the fleeing driver, Mr. Floyd. 
In summary, the Court concludes, as to the defendants Salem City and 
Spanish Fork City, and Officers James and Asay, that said cities and individuals 
are immune by virtue of Section 63-30-7(2), as it existed at the time of the 
accident; that in any event, their involvement was remote, collateral and 
secondary, and was not the cause in fact of either the chase or the collision; that 
as a matter of law, the sole proximate cause of the collision was the negligent and 
reckless conduct of the fleeing driver; that said defendants and their employers 
are immune by virtue of the discretionary function exception to the waiver of 
immunity found in Section 63-30-10(1) of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act; and 
that said defendants are thereby immune. 
Accordingly, for the reasons above stated, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the Motions of the defendants Salem City Corporation, Brad 
James, Spanish Fork City Corporation, and Ed Asay are hereby granted, and it 
is further 
ORDERED that summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of said defen-
dants and against the plaintiff, no cause of action, and plaintiff's Complaint is 
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits, defendants to recover their costs. 
-3 -
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3^ 
DATED this /J day of August, 1992. 
~ / 
B^THE COUBtf': 
District Court Judg< 
& ^ichdrdli. Moffat/ / 
re 
/ 
*> A. r. 
V 
26\ALL\13607.163\pldg.o«j 
-4-
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EXHffilT D 
63-30-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages 
against a governmental entity or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, em-
ployees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing 
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of 
an advisory body, student teachers certificated in accordance with 
Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing 
services to members of the public in the course of an approved medi-
cal, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training pro-
gram, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent 
contractor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsec-
tion (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position re-
ceives compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivi-
sions as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, opera-
tion, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or 
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is char-
acterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental func-
tion, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential 
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or 
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any depart-
ment, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of prop-
erty, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, 
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent. 
(6) "Personal iiyury" means an iiyury of any kind other than property 
damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school dis-
trict, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement 
or taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corpora-
tion. 
(8) "Property damage" means iiyury to, or loss of, any right, title, es-
tate, or interest in real or personal property. 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, depart-
ment, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, & 2; 1973, ch. 
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, S 1; 
1983, ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1988, ch. 2, t 338. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment alphabetized the definitions of this sec-
tion and renumbered the subsections accord-
ingly, added present Subsection (4), and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctua-
tion. 
The 1987 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective 
June 3,1987, designated the former provisions 
of Subsection (2) as (2)(a) and added subsection 
(2)(b); and substituted "includes a governmen-
tal entity's officers, employees, servants, 
trustees, commissioners, members of a govern-
ing body, members of a board, members of a 
commission, or members of an advisory body" 
for "means any officer, employee, or servant of 
a governmental entity, whether or not compen-
sated, including" and inserted "but does not 
include an independent contractor" in Subsec-
tion (2)(a). 
The 1988 amendment, effective February 2, 
1988, in Subsection (2)(a) substituted "53A-6-
101" for "53-2-15." 
UTAH CODE ANN. 63-30-7 (SUPP. 1990) 
63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent op-
eration of motor vehicles — Exception. 
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle 
or other equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of authority. 
(b) This subsection does not apply to the operation of emergency vehi-
cles as defined by law and while being driven in accordance with the 
requirements of Section 41-6-14. 
(2) (a) All governmental entities employing peace officers retain and do not 
waive immunity from liability for civil damages for personal injury or 
death or for damage to property resulting from the collision of a vehicle 
being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is being, 
has been, or believes he is being or has been pursued by a peace officer 
employed by the governmental entity in a motor vehicle. 
(b) Enactment of this subsection does not state nor imply that this 
immunity was ever previously waived or this liability specifically or im-
plicitly recognized. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 7; 1983, ch. ment, effective April 23, 1990, designated the 
129, i 5; 1990, ch. 204, ( 1. former section as Subsection (1); added Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- tion (2); and made related stylistic changes. 
UTAH CODE ANN- 63-30-10 (1989) 
Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent 
act or omission of employee — Exceptions — 
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights [Effective July 1, 1990]. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the iiyury arises out of: 
(a) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prose-
cution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, inter-
ference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights; 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection of any property; 
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; 
(f) a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it is negligent 
or intentional; 
(g) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, 
mob violence, and civil disturbances; 
(h) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city 
jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(k) any natural condition on state lands or as the result of any activity 
authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
G) the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous wastes; or 
(iv) emergency evacuations; or 
(m) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for 
the clearing of fog. 
(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for iiyury 
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth 
amendment rights under Chapter 16, Title 78, which is the exclusive 
remedy for injuries to those protected rights. 
(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Rule 12(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
or any parts of either of them are held invalid or unconstitutional, this 
subsection is void and governmental entities remain immune from suit 
for violations of fourth amendment rights. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. 
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1; 
1989, ch. 185, * 1; 1989, ch. 187, ( 3; 1989, 
ch. 268, S 29. 
Amended effective July 1, 1990. — Laws 
1989, ch. 187, § 3 amends this section effective 
July 1, 1990. See fourth paragraph of amend-
ment note below. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment, effective March 18,1985, added Subsec-
tion (1)0) and made minor changes in phraseol-
ogy. 
The 1989 amendment by ch. 185, effective 
April 24, 1989, added Subsection (l)(m) and 
designated the first and second sentences of 
Subsection (2) as Subsections (2)(a) and (b). 
The 1989 amendment by ch. 268, effective 
July 1,1989, substituted "Board of State Lands 
and Forestry" for "State Land Board" in Sub-
section (l)(k), subdivided Subsection (1)0) and 
made related punctuation changes, and re-
wrote Subsection (lXIXiii), which had read, 
"hf lndl inor hfiTflvd/Mie m o t o r i o l a n 
The 1989 amendment by ch. 187, effective 
July 1,1990, added "arises out or to the intro-
ductory paragraph in Subsection (1) and de-
leted it from the beginning of each subsection 
of Subsection (1); substituted "Board of State 
Lands and Forestry" for "State Land Board" in 
Subsection (l)(k); substituted "Rule 12(g), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure" for "Sub-
section 77-35-12(g)" in Subsection (2); and 
made minor stylistic changes. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Compiler's Notes. — Sections 78-16-5 and 
77-35-12(g) (Criminal Procedure Rule 12(g)), 
cited in Subsection (2Kb), were held unconsti-
tutional in State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 
(Utah 1987). See case note under catchline 
^Constitutionality," below. 
Cro8S-Reference8. — Indemnification of 
public officers and employees, §§ 63-30-36 to 
CO OA OO 
UTAH CODE ANN. 63-30-10 (SUPP. 1992) 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proxi-
mately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prose-
cution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, inter-
ference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of 
civil rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent 
or intentional; 
(7) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, 
mob violence, and civil disturbances; 
(8) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city 
jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any 
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining oper-
ation, or any activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and For-
estry; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for 
the clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disas-
ters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accor-
dance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, 
or other structure located on them; 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public 
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement; or 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or haz-
ardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, t 10; 1975, ch. 
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, S 1; 
1989, ch. 185, S 1; 1989, ch. 187, S 3; 1989, 
ch. 268, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. 
319, {§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 76, I 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment by ch. 15, effective July 1,1990, deleted 
the subsection designation (1) from the begin-
ning of the section, redesignated former Sub-
sections (l)(a) to (1)(D as Subsections (1) to (13) 
and made related changes, and deleted former 
Subsection (2), waiving immunity from suit for 
violation of Fourth Amendment rights and 
making the provisions of Chapter 16 of Title 78 
the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by 
such violations. 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 319, effective 
July 1, 1990, added Subsection (13)(e) and 
made a related stylistic change. 
1991, added Subsections (13) through (17) and 
redesignated former Subsection (13) as present 
Subsection (18), inserted "Violation o r before 
"civil rights" in Subsection (2), deleted "of any 
property" following "inspection" in Subsection 
(4), made minor stylistic changes in Subsec-
tions (6) and (12), and rewrote Subsection (11), 
which read: "any natural condition on state 
lands or as the result of any activity authorized 
by the Board of State Lands and Forestry.w 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1991, ch. 76, 
which amended this section and §§ 63-30-4, 
63-30-8, 63-30-9, 63-30-10.5, 63-30-11, 63-30-
33, 63-30-34, and 63-30-36, provides in § 11 
that "This act has prospective effect only and 
any changes to the law caused by this act do 
not apply to any claims based upon injuries or 
losses that occurred before the effective date of 
thitt act rAnril 9Q 1QQ11" 
41*6-14. Emergency vehicles — Applicability of traffic law 
to highway work vehicles — Exemptions. 
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to 
an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of 
the law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may 
exercise the privileges under this section, subject to Subsection (2). 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter; 
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing 
down as may be necessary for safe operation; 
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits if the operator does not endanger 
life or property; or 
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning 
in specified directions. 
(3) Privileges granted under this section to an authorized emergency vehi-
cle apply only when the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section 
41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is 
visible from in front of the vehicle. 
(a) The privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to operate the vehicle with 
regard for the safety of all persons, or protect the operator from the conse-
quences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges. 
(b) Except for Sections 41-6-13.5, 41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this chapter 
does not apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other equipment while 
actually engaged in work upon the surface of a highway. However, the 
entire chapter applies to those persons and vehicles when traveling to or 
from the work. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-14, enacted by L. 
1955, ch. 71, | 1 ; L 1961, ch. 86, S 1; 1965, 
ch. 83, S 1; 1978, ch. 83, i 4; 1987, ch. 138, 
§7. 
Repeals and Enactment*. — Laws 1955, 
ch. 71, § 1 repealed former section 41-6-14 (L. 
1941, ch. 52, § 5; C. 1943, 57-7-82; L. 1949, ch. 
65, § 1), relating to applicability and exemp-
tions from act of certain drivers, and enacted 
present section 41-6-14. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operator" for "driver" 
throughout the section; in Subsection (1) sub-
stituted "Subsection (2)" for "the conditions 
herein stated"; substituted the present provi-
sions of Subsection (3) for those set out in the 
bound volume and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation throughout the 
section. 
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I . PURPOSE: 
To establish guidelines regarding the pursuit and apprehension of 
violators of the criminal law by department personnel. 
II. LEGAL DISCLAIMER: 
This policy is for departmental use only and does not apply to any 
criminal or civil proceeding. This policy shall not be construed as 
creating a higher legal standard of care or safety in an evidentiary 
sense with respect to third party claims. Violations of this policy 
will form the basis of departmental administrative sanctions only. 
III. POLICY: 
It is the policy of the Department of Public Safety to identify and 
apprehend violators of the criminal law. Pursuit driving is necessi-
tated by the suspects disregard for the law and the safety of others, 
and the responsibility charged to law enforcement officers to apprehend 
such persons. 
Sworn officers of the department shall conduct pursuits in compliance 
with Title 41-6-14 UCA., sound professional judgement and the procedures 
outlined in this policy. 
IV. DEFINITIONS: 
A. Pursuit: 
An event involving one or more law enforcement officers attempting 
to apprehend a suspect operating a motor vehicle while the suspect 
is trying to avoid arrest by using high-speed driving or other 
evasive tactics, such as driving off a highway, turning suddenly or 
driving in a legal manner but willfully failing to yield to the 
officer's signal to stop. 
B. Roadblock: 
Establishing a physical impediment to traffic as means for stopping 
a vehicle using signs, devices, actual physical obstructions, or 
barricades. 
C. Ramming: 
The deliberate act of impacting a violator's vehicle with another 
vehicle to functionally damage or otherwise force the violator's 
vehicle to stop. 
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D. Boxing-in: 
A technique designed to stop a violator's vehicle by surrounding it 
with law enforcement vehicles and then slowing all vehicles to a 
stop. 
E. Channelization: 
A technique similar to a roadblock where objects are placed in the 
anticipated path of a pursued vehicle which tends to alter its 
direction. 
F. Supervisor: 
For the purpose of this policy, a supervisor is a member of this 
department of the rank of sergeant or above, or a designated 
officer-in-charge (OIC). 
V. PROCEDURE: 
A. Upon initiating a pursuit, the officer wili engage his emergency 
equipment in compliance with Title 41-6-76 UCA. 
B. The officer will notify dispatch and provide the following 
information: 
1. Description of the vehicle 
2. Number of occupants 
3. Reason for the pursuit 
4. Location, direction of travel and estimated speed 
C. No other unit should engage in the pursuit unless and until 
requested by a supervisor or initiating officer if no supervisor is 
available. 
D. All units involved in the pursuit should operate on the statewide 
radio channel. 
E. Notification of a pursuit by another allied agency shall not be 
construed as request to officers of this department to join in the 
pursuit, unless such request is specifically made by the pursuing 
agency. 
F. When the pursuit continues into the jurisdiction of an allied 
agency the officer or supervisor may consider requesting that 
allied agency to pick up and continue the pursuit. 
G. If the pursuit is concluded by an allied agency the initiating 
officer, if practical, should proceed to the termination point and 
provide arrest information and other appropriate assistance. 
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H. PURSUIT WITH PASSENGERS PROHIBITED: Officers shall not engage in 
high speed pursuits when their vehicle is occupied by prisoners, 
suspects, complainants, witnesses or any other persons not on duty 
as sworn peace officers of the state. This prohibition applies 
whether or not the passenger has signed a waiver of liability. 
I. TERMINATION OF PURSUIT: 
The initiating officer or a supervisor may terminate the pursuit 
when: 
1. In the opinion of the pursuing officer(s) or a supervisor, the 
danger created by continuing the pursuit out weighs the need 
for an immediate apprehension; or, 
2. The subject can be identified and there is no longer a need 
for an imnediate apprehension; or, 
3. The location of the pursued vehicle is no longer known. 
J. FORCIBLE STOPS: 
1. The use of forcible stops such as roadblocks, ramming, 
boxing-in and channelization are a last resort measure and 
should be evaluated by the officer in a similar fashion as the 
use of deadly force. 
2. Forcible stops may be undertaken only when the officer or a 
supervisor has reason to believe that the continued movement 
of the pursued vehicle would place others in imminent danger 
of great bodily harm or death AND 
3. When the apparent risk of harm to other than the occupants of 
the pursued vehicle is so great as to out weigh the apparent 
risk of harm involved in making the forcible stop, AND 
4. After all reasonable alternative means of apprehension have 
been considered, and rejected as impractical. 
5. The tactics selected should offer the greatest probability of 
success with the least likelihood of injury to the general 
public, the officer and the subject. 
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K. SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY: 
1. Upon notification of a pursuit, the supervisor shall evaluate 
and consider if appropriate: 
a. Aborting the pursuit when necessary 
b. Ensuring tactics are in conformance with department policy 
c. Ensuring only the necessary number of units are involved 
d. Proper radio channels and procedures are in use 
e. Allied agencies are notified 
f• Post-Incident notifications 
2* The supervisor should proceed to the termination point of the 
pursuit when practical and provide appropriate assistance ana 
supervision at the scene. 
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